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ERICE. PETERSON
DIVERSITY AND FRANCO-AMERICAN IDENTITY
POLITICS
As Barry Rodrigue suggests, there are many 
definitions of Franco-American identity. In this article 
Eric Peterson explores these multiple meanings which, 
as he points out, are rooted in the ways different groups 
interact. I f  cultural differences are to serve our society 
as a source of flexibility and creativity, we must learn 
to appreciate diversity in our daily interactions.
The renewed controversy over immigration in recent years 
challenges the value of “diversity” and “ethnic identity” in the 
United States.1 Scholarship on these issues has vacillated over 
the decades. Traditionally, Americans believed that assimilation 
into the dominant Anglo-Saxon culture and the eradication of 
ethnic difference was an ideal goal. More recently, scholars like 
Gregory Bateson have argued that diversity and difference 
among social groups is not only inevitable but desirable. Bateson 
believes that a healthy ecology of human civilization requires 
“diversity in the civilization, not only to accommodate the 
genetic and experiential diversity of persons, but also to provide 
the flexibility and 'preadaptation’ necessary for unpredictable 
change.”2 However, this view of ethnic identity is not based on 
a definition of difference as the possession of specific ethnic, 
racial, or national attributes. This article focuses on issues of 
identity based on relationships between groups. As Kobena 
Mercer states, “identities are not found but made;...they are not 
just there, waiting to be discovered in the vocabulary of Nature, 
but...culturally and politically constructed through political an­
tagonism and cultural struggle.”"1
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T raditionally, scholars assumed that assimilation was a desirable goal. The concept, however, did not mean the same thing to everyone. Iris Marion 
Young identifies a “conformist ideal” and a “transformational 
ideal” of assimilation.4 A recent column by George Will on 
immigration illustrates these two views. The conformist view 
denies the reality of social groups. Will identifies an 
“anti-assimilationist impulse” as coming “primarily from those 
native-born intellectuals who believe America is a sick, racist, 
sexist, exploitative, oppressive, patriarchal, etc. society into 
which no self-respecting person would wish to assimilate.” It is 
important to note that by “native-born” Will does not mean 
American Indian. He uses the term to refer to the descendants 
of European immigrants, in contrast with current immigrants 
from Mexico, Central America, and Asia. In other words, Will 
conveniently ignores the “anti-assimilationist impulse” of Euro­
pean colonists who did not attempt to assimilate into existing 
American Indian cultures between 1607 and 1890. Indeed, they 
attempted to destroy them. Will assumes “America” to be an 
intact, already existing culture. As he states, “Debate should 
begin with this premise: America...is a culture”
The conformist view sees social group identity and advo­
cacy simply as a means to gain special privileges that would be 
otherwise unobtainable. Affirmative action programs are criti­
cized for promoting “quotas” and “reverse discrimination” as 
privileges for specific social groups -  what in Will’s argument is 
called an “entitlement mentality.” The conformist view does not 
deny that individuals possess a particular ethnic ancestry. Rather, 
it sees such ethnic ancestry as past, and not present, as part of 
each person’s background and not their daily life. Hence no one 
particular ethnic group “exists” in the sense that it defines 
identity in everyday life.
In Maine, where approximately 35 percent of the popula­
tion claims French, French-Canadian, or Franco-American an­
cestry, the conformist view pervades the dominant culture of 
mass media, schools, and business. With the exception of a few 
communities and sections of the state, a visitor to Maine would
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be hard pressed to learn of even the existence of Franco- 
Americans. As Denis Ledoux points out, when one drives down 
a Maine highway there are plenty of signs proclaiming “Yankee 
Grocer,” “Yankee Carwash,” or “Yankee Housebuilder”; “Obvi­
ously being Yankee is something to...announce publicly.” Simi­
lar signs proclaiming Franco-American identity are non-existent.5 
Major state newspapers or television broadcasts rarely draw 
attention to Franco-American heritage or culture. When 
Franco-American identity is noticed, it is in such stories as the 
yearly Acadian Festival: coverage which reduces the festival to 
the status of other “similar” events such as lobster, egg, blue­
berry, or potato festivals. Another group of stories on 
Franco-American identity occurs in isolated reports on the 
discrimination and harassment of Francos, which plays into the 
conformist view that social group identity is merely a means for 
gaining unfair advantage through legal manipulation.
The transformational view, on the other hand, accepts the 
existence of social groups but denies their desirability. Those 
who accept the transformational view acknowledge particular 
ethnic heritages, but see their continuation as undesirable. This 
perspective is epitomized in the view of the United States as the 
“melting pot,” wherein ethnic group identity is to be dissolved 
into a homogeneous "national” identity.
For Franco-Americans in Maine, the transformational view 
is not merely an external force; pressure for assimilation also 
comes from within the Franco community. In describing these 
pressures, D. Poulin writes that:
Most French-Canadian-Americans of my genera­
tion spent the better part of our adolescence and 
early adulthood working hard at negating and 
trying to erase all traces of our French-Canadian 
heritage. First the accent, then the language, then 
the faith, the customs and the “manners.” We 
were “White Niggers,” hell bent on becoming 
categorically assimilated.6
The attempt to erase ethnic differences is not accidental, 
but forms an important part of the assimilation ideal.
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The ideal of assimilation devalues difference in a two-step 
operation. First, the ethnic identity of privileged groups is 
assumed to be “American” and therefore neutral and universal. 
Second, non-privileged groups are seen as "modified Ameri­
cans” and are identified by such labels as Franco-American, 
Native-American, or African-American. Their assimilation in­
volves the negation and stripping away of anything which marks 
their uniqueness. The uniqueness of privileged groups, by 
contrast, remains "unmarked” and unaltered.
The devaluing of difference exploits ethnic groups as a 
means to establish dominant-group identity. Ethnic groups 
function as a resource by which an “us” can be defined and a 
stable identity maintained. However, such thinking threatens 
society, Bateson argues, because it pits the survival of privileges 
for specific groups against a cultural environment of multiple 
groups. And any civilization that destroys its cultural environ­
ment, in order to maintain a particular system of privileges, 
threatens its own existence. Thus, the opposition of privileged 
identity and multicultural environment is a false opposition in 
that the destruction of a multicultural environment entails the 
destruction of the privileged system which it supports. As 
Bateson remarks, “the creature that wins against its environment 
destroys itself S'1
T he challenge of developing a critical perspective on multiculturalism requires rethinking the meaning of difference and identity.8 A recent incident involv­
ing a radio broadcast illustrates the importance of not merely 
celebrating “essences” or excluded groups in society. In 
1992-1993, the Holocaust Human Rights Center, the Associa­
tion Canado-Amricain, and other groups protested a radio 
comedy routine broadcast by WBLM of Portland. The broad­
casts featured a Franco-American character called “Frenchie,” 
who spoke with a pronounced accent and told jokes or stories. 
The Holocaust Human Rights Center claimed that the broad­
casts were examples of bigotry and prejudice. They singled out 
one skit, in which “Frenchie” had difficulty in counting record  
albums, as particularly offensive. The radio station management
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claimed that the “Frenchie” character was not derogatory be­
cause the person who played him was a Franco-American. They 
authenticated Frenchie because he possessed a specific ancestry, 
which in turn constituted his identity. One could argue that 
“non-authentic” groups -  such as the Holocaust Human Rights 
Center -  had no basis for questioning the radio station. How 
could a non-Franco-American know better than a Franco-Amer­
ican what is derogatory?
Rather than define difference according to static categories 
such as ancestry, Young suggests a relational understanding of 
difference based on interactions among groups and institutions. 
She emphasizes group affinities rather than a listing of specific 
characteristics or a common ancestry.
Membership in a social group is a function not of 
satisfying some objective criteria, but of a subjec­
tive affirmation of affinity with that group, the 
affirmation of that affinity by other members of 
the group, and the attribution of membership in 
that group by persons identifying with other 
groups.9
The affinities which differentiate Franco-Americans in Maine 
illustrate such a relational understanding. Let us briefly explore 
six of the multiple and heterogeneous borders which mark out 
Franco-American identity: language, class, gender, age, religion, 
and schooling.
While language initially may appear to be an easy difference 
to use in identifying Franco-Americans, such a singular emphasis 
repeats the errors of categorization. After all, not all Francophones 
are Franco-American, and not all Franco-Americans are 
Francophones. A recent incident at Bates College illustrates how 
language cannot be separated from other forms of affinity. Bates 
College President Donald W. Harward issued an order to 
suspend the practice of asking employees not to speak French if 
a non French-speaking employee was nearby. Harward com­
mented that “evidently, isolated practices, developed over a
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decade ago, were initiated in several service departments for the 
positive intention of being courteous.”10 Typically, speaking 
French, in and of itself, is not seen as a problem in colleges -  
especially when most schools go to great lengths to encourage 
student enrollments in language courses. In this case, however, 
it was not the use of French by students or faculty that was at 
issue, but the language used by service employees. Until Harward’s 
intervention, class clearly distinguished the group whose lan­
guage required control.
While shared language is often assumed as the difference 
which marks inclusion and exclusion in a group, other differ­
ences may supersede language in articulating affinities. For 
example, when a Franco-American woman applied for member­
ship in Le Club Calumet of Augusta -  a club whose stated goals 
are the promotion of French culture and language -  her applica­
tion was rejected on the basis of gender.11 The effort by Le Club 
Calumet to exclude women is part of a larger historical struggle 
of social clubs to control privilege through membership. Such 
rules reject women, as well as members of “other” social groups. 
They assume that one group, in this case men, set the criteria for 
group membership, and this group can “promote” French 
culture and language. Ironically, as Labbe points out, the Club 
ignores arguments within the Franco community that “women 
have been and are the principal transmitters of the culture and 
language.”12 What this example illustrates is the failure of 
categorical criteria (as in men of French ancestry) as a way to 
define difference.
For some Franco-Americans, Anglo culture is a substitute 
for a culture which they think is too conservative. “Teenage 
rebellion” provides Franco youth a way to emphasize other 
affinities, such as age, and displace those of their parents and 
community. Another example of how “rebellion” can be articu­
lated in different ways can be seen in the use of “Frog” by the 
University of Maine Franco-American Center. The Center 
initially used “Frog” in its telephone number as a strategy to 
reclaim the power of naming.13 This strategy, which recalls other 
renaming efforts such as “black is beautiful” and “gay pride,” is
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effective because it operates in a specific college-aged commu­
nity, in a specific historical context. When separated from this 
context, the term “Frog” is viewed as an ethnic slur, rather than 
a renaming. For example, “Frenchie” challenged critics from the 
University for being hypocritical: they criticized his perpetuating 
“dumb Frenchman” stereotypes when they themselves used the 
word “Frog.” The danger of rebellion is that it may reinforce 
reactionary rather than revisionary efforts.
One of the institutional affinities which structures Franco 
American communities is the Roman Catholic church. As a 
physical entity in Franco American communities, the church is 
often the largest building and tends to dominate the landscape, 
as well as the culture. J . Dufresne refers to this cultural, as well 
as religious domination in his comment that
We French kids were not eager to succumb to the 
American Protestant ideals of prosperity, ambi­
tion and acquisitiveness. Those were the days of 
Franco-Catholicism when we believed that pov­
erty was a badge of holiness, a condition to be 
embraced and not one to be ashamed o f 11
Nevertheless, not all Franco-Americans are Catholic; nor 
do all Catholic Franco-Americans interpret the structuring fea­
tures of Roman Catholicism favorably. In fact, priests may have 
acted as agents of assimilation during periods of immigration. 
For example, parish priests facilitated name changes (“Levesque” 
to “Bishop,” or “Boisvert” to “Greenwood”) so that Franco men 
would have an easier time finding employment in the mills of 
Maine. Some Franco-American women chose not to affiliate 
with the Roman Catholic church because of its sexism and male 
domination.
As with the church, schools and schooling occupy an 
ambiguous place in Franco-American culture. M.A. Perry points 
out that many early schools were associated with parishes be­
cause public schools refused to teach French. While separate 
schooling has the advantage of maintaining an emphasis on the 
French language, parochial schools also may emphasize Catholic
64
IDENTITY POLITICS
teachings more than Franco-American culture. Perry also points 
out that educational separatism may reinforce attitudes of ethnic 
superiority in the struggle to maintain cultural survival.15 But not 
all Catholic schools fostered Franco-American culture. Levesque 
describes a grade school in the St.John Valley that prohibited the 
use of French in fifth and sixth grade classes.16
The focus on language, class, gender, age, religion, and 
schooling should not obscure the importance of other parts of 
Franco-American cultural life -  such as work, music, dance, and 
food. But as discussion of these examples illustrates, there are 
no common or unitary meanings for language, class, gender, 
age, religion, and schooling that might define a Franco-American 
difference. The differences which mark Franco-American iden­
tity are not based in an “essence” or a common “experience.” 
Rather, “Franco-American” names a terrain of contested affini­
ties and commitments which shape participation of members 
within the social group and in contrast to other social groups.
A relational definition of difference challenges as­sumptions about the ideal of assimilation and the meaning of identity. However, relational affinities 
must be defined carefully to guard against romanticizing ideal­
ized and undifferentiated “folk” communities. This romanti­
cism can be found in metaphors used to describe social identity: 
“Building bridges,” “tearing down walls,” “or being blind to 
difference” suggest that difference is an obstacle, something to 
be abolished. As a model for community, this romantic ideal 
perpetuates a “metaphysics of presence” in attempting to deny 
the lived differences among persons.17 By contrast, a relational 
definition uses difference to understand how groups define 
themselves in taking social and political action.
Does one have to be Franco-American in order to advance 
the interests of Franco-Americans? Does every interest advanced 
by a Franco-American constitute an expression of an "authentic” 
Franco-American concern? L. Grossberg argues that such “iden­
tity politics” tends to perpetuate the assumption that “people act 
based on a calculation of their interests, which are rooted in their 
experiences, which are determined by their identity, which is an
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expression or representation of their place within a system of 
social d ifferen ces.”18 Ju st because one belongs to a 
Franco-American community does not mean that one’s commit­
ments will necessarily advance the interests ofFranco-Americans. 
On the other hand, experience (such as the Franco-American 
experience of Anglo-centrism, or women’s experience of male 
domination) should not be discarded because there is no simple 
or direct connection with ethnic identity.
Grossberg questions whether such identity politics can 
effectively oppose conservative views about immigration and 
assimilation. Direct experiences which support identity politics 
do not necessarily lead to political action. As the earlier 
discussion of the Acadian Festival indicates, a celebration of 
culture does not necessarily lead to a larger political struggle with 
the dominant culture. In a similar way, Labbe’s response to the 
“Frenchie” incident suggests the importance of going beyond 
cultural action to “engage in and model a public dialogue which 
goes beyond the personal and intimate, beyond the family.’' 
Such political action is essential, Labbe points out, “if we are to 
avoid being tourists within our own culture. We must deal with 
the historical hand we have been dealt. Or we are in serious 
danger of making up a cultural identity or having it perpetuated 
for us.”19
This concern with political action recalls Bateson’s focus on 
changing the ways we think about diversity in human civilization. 
Bateson thought the ecological crisis would stimulate changes in 
our ways of thinking about diversity and would profoundly alter 
government, economic structure, and educational philosophy. 
“We hope that the period of change may be characterized by 
wisdom, rather than by either violence or the fear of violence.”20 
If diversity is to serve as a source of social flexibility rather than 
an excuse for violence, we must change our habits of thought 
about ethnic identity and work to include diversity at both local 
and global levels. If Franco-American identity is to mean more 
than a celebration of customs and ancestry -  or an excuse for 
bigotry -  we must work to make diversity a productive part of 
everyday life and our social and political institutions.
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